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1Introduction
The role of the state in national economies is changing everywhere, but nowhere more
dramatically than in the transition economies.  Vietnam is no exception.  The essence
of the set of reforms adopted under the banner of doi moi was a political decision to
change the role of the state in the economy of Vietnam, to abandon central planning in
favour of a “market-based, multi-sector economy with a socialist orientation.”
While the state, or more precisely the political authorities, initiated many of the
changes in the state-market relationship, some changes occurred spontaneously at the
grassroots level and only later became validated by the political decision makers.
Furthermore, the shift away from central planning did not occur abruptly with the
adoption of doi moi at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party in 1986, but rather
occurred gradually as the state responded to widespread shortages of food and other
commodities by loosening the tight controls of the central plan and allowing parallel
markets to evolve. It is argued in Section I of this paper that the emergence of parallel
markets in agriculture and industry in the early 1980s, by providing incentives to save
and invest and by encouraging the monetization of the economy, contributed
significantly to the success of the subsequent structural reforms and stabilization
measures taken under doi moi.
The redefinition of the role of the state in the late 1980s brought about what has been
labeled as “one of the more dramatic turnarounds in economic history” (Dollar and
2Litvack 1994).  However, while much has changed, some things remain the same.
Allowing markets to develop and giving the right to private property have naturally
encouraged the emergence of a private sector in Vietnam.  The state recognizes that
private economic activity and initiative are necessary for economic success, and yet
there is great political ambivalence about the private sector.  Many policy measures
taken and not taken in the 1990s can be seen as attempts by the state to encourage and
at the same time control (and thereby stifle) the private sector. In Section II, we
discuss how this contradictory approach to the market economy and the private sector
has distorted the structure of the economy, discouraged the emergence of a dynamic
private corporate sector and frustrated the country’s efforts to achieve sustained long-
term growth.
What further redefinition of the role of the state in the economy is required for
Vietnam to achieve its long-term development objectives?  This question is addressed
in Section III. It is argued that, as a catalyst for growth, the state should develop the
legal/commercial infrastructure for a market economy.  Furthermore there is a great
need for the institution of market-friendly and efficiency-enhancing regulations in the
financial sector, and the continuous effort to move towards indirect (rather than
direct) controls over interest rates and credit. The state should enhance the
institutional framework for Vietnam to participate more fully in the international
trading system. It should continue to remove the discriminations against the domestic
private sector, and encourage foreign participation in the provision of physical
infrastructure services. In due course, the state should introduce industrial re-
structuring and competition policy in the management of the state owned monopolies,
while at the same time, set up an institutional framework for some form of social
3insurance. In this way, the state can play a positive role as partner to the private sector
and as a catalyst to long-term sustainable growth.
I.  Reforms in the 1980s, “doi moi”, and the role of the state
Up until the introduction of a package of reforms in 1989, which combined
macroeconomic stabilization with strong moves towards a market economy (the so-
called doi moi or economic renovation), many of the reforms in the early 1980s were
of a “stop-go” nature, reacting essentially to food and other shortages. In spite of the
apparent lack of direction, however, it will be seen that these reforms did have a
profound impact on the economy by shifting it away from central planning.
The Move away from Central Planning
In 1981, in response to falling food production and stagnation in industrial output, the
state introduced the “contract system” in agriculture, and the “three-point-plan” in
industries. The contract system marked the beginning of de-collectivization of
agriculture by allocating individual plots of land to farmers and allowing them to
make decisions regarding land management. Although most of the rice produced was
required to be sold to the state at low prices, in practice, approximately 20% of the
rice production was sold by farmers at substantially higher prices in the parallel
markets. Thus, the contract system represented a tentative move towards private
property rights and created incentives for farmers to work harder and to manage their
allotted land more efficiently. Between 1981 and 1987, rice production grew at an
annual rate of 4.2% (compared with 0.4% p.a. between 1976 and 1980). Furthermore,
4the use of materials (mainly fertilizers) grew at an annual rate of 3.3% during the
period of the contract system, compared with a negative annual growth of –1.1% in
the four years before 1981 under central planning (see Table 1 from Che, Kompas and
Vousden 1999).
Table 1: Output and Inputs for Rice Production in Vietnam
Annual Growth Rates (%)
Output Labour Land Materials Capital TFP
1976-80 0.4 0.4 -0.8 -1.1 2.2 0.6
1981-87 4.2 0.3 -1.2 3.3 1.7 3.3
1988-94 6.1 1.3 -0.5 5.6 10.6 3.1
Source: Che (1997), Table 7.1.
On the industrial side, the three-point-plan meant that not only were state owned
enterprises (SOEs) able to produce goods for the state using state-supplied inputs
(plan A), they were also allowed to procure inputs outside the state plan and sell the
output to the state (plan B), and furthermore they were permitted to procure inputs
outside the state plan and sell the surplus output on the parallel market (plan C). Like
the contract system in agriculture, plans B and C gave some degree of de-centralized
decision-making to the individual production units in the management of inputs and
outputs. Not only did these early reforms result in greater incentives to produce more
efficiently, but they also gave rise to the dual price system and strengthened the
parallel economy. As will be argued later, the development of parallel markets was
important to the success both of macroeconomic stabilization in 1989 and of further
liberalization and growth in agriculture in the 1990s.
5Parallel Markets and the Failure of 1985 Reforms
In addition to improving allocative efficiency, the development of parallel markets
(estimated at between one-third to two-thirds of total retail sales in the 1980s)
contributed to macroeconomic stability, in particular by allowing Vietnam to avoid a
large “monetary overhang” in the 1980s (Leung and Vo 1996). Monetary overhangs
typically occur in centrally planned economies as a result of SOEs taking advantage
of credit from state banks at zero (or near zero) interest rates and hoarding labour and
other inputs from households in an effort to ensure the fulfillment of state plans. This
implies injections of cash into the household sector. However, since there are usually
few consumption or investment opportunities for households (in the absence of
significant parallel markets), injections of cash exceed household expenditures, and
households are forced to accumulate money holdings. The manifestation of this
overhang of the money stock is the physical shortages observed in centrally planned
economies, with prices regulated to avoid outbreaks (or to “repress’) inflation.
The early reforms in agriculture and industry allowed Vietnam to move away from a
strict centrally planned economy to a more modified version, and as Leung and Vo
(1996) have argued, monetary overhang was virtually non-existent by 1985.
Therefore, the confiscatory monetary policy in 1985 1(making one “new” dong equal
to ten “old” dongs), instead of eliminating the excess stock of money held by
households, penalized the SOEs which had accumulated large stocks of dong assets
                                                
1 Wealth held in dong assets was being confiscated because nominal prices were kept unchanged.
6for purchasing inputs from the parallel markets. The subsequent “bail out” of the
SOEs through budget subsidies and monetizing the budget deficits resulted in the
hyperinflation episode of 1985-1988, and spelt the failure of the 1985 price-salary-
money reform (see Table 2 from Leung and Vo 1996). The rampant inflation
undermined financial wealth, the exchange rate, real wages, and the effectiveness of
the public sector. It also undermined the contract system, and food production
stagnated, contributing further to inflation.
Table 2: Budget (% Of GDP), Domestic Credits And Inflation
(annual % change)
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Revenue 14.5 14.5 13.2 12.2 11.3 14.0 14.9 13.7 19.0 22.5
- SOE transfers 10.5 11.2 9.5 9.2 7.2 8.1 8.8 8.2 10.2 11.2
- Tax revenue 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.9 3.9 4.1 3.7 5.0 8.3
Curr. exp. (exc. int.) 13.5 18.0 12.9 12.7 14.0 15.6 14.9 11.5 14.0 18.8
- Wages & salaries 0.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.7 4.6 3.7 2.1 n.a 6.5
- Subsidies 5.2 4.7 2.9 4.9 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a 0.2
Capital exp. 4.1 8.2 5.9 3.9 4.4 5.8 5.2 2.8 5.8 7.0
- Primary deficit -3.1 -11.8 -5.7 -4.3 -7.0 -7.3 -5.2 -0.7 -0.8 -3.3
- Interest 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.3
Overall deficit -3.3 -12.0 -5.8 -4.4 -7.2 -7.6 -5.9 -1.5 -1.7 -4.6
Financing 3.3 12.0 5.8 4.4 7.2b 7.6 5.9 1.5 1.7 4.6
- Foreign 2.3 4.9 2.2 1.4 2.4 1.5 3.1 1.0 2.4 2.7
- State bank 0.6 7.1 3.6 2.9 2.9 6.9 2.0 0.9 -2.0 1.8
- Gov. securities 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.8 -0.4 1.3 1.8
Domestic credit 41 301 429 248 395 175 34 47 20 58.2
- Government (net) n.a n.a n.a 321 736 370 26 4 -54 102.3
- SOE sector n.a n.a n.a 221 355 111 43 78 36 24.7
- Other & privatec, n.a n.a n.a 347 235 95 21 68 174 177.9
Inflation 65 92 487 301 308 35 68 68 18 5.2
a Preliminary estimation;
b arrears = 1.7;
c before 1992 most credits had gone to the cooperative sector.
Sources: For budget structure, World Bank (1994b, Table 5.1, p. 118 and 1992, Table 5.1, p. 141); for
domestic credit and inflation, see Charts 2 and 3.
For 1993 data: WB report number 17031-VN "Vietnam Deepening Reform for Growth" - 1997
                                                                                                                                           
7This experience clearly demonstrates that the earlier microeconomic reforms in
agriculture and industry required the reinforcement of macroeconomic stabilization;
specifically, there had to be a cessation of budget subsidies to SOEs in order to reduce
budget deficits, and the reduced budget deficits had to be financed by means other
than monetization. Like the tentative moves to private property rights in agriculture
and de-centralized decision making in SOEs in the early 1980s, changing the
macroeconomic relationships and stabilizing the macroeconomy are functions which
only the state can perform, and in this case, this was done successfully under the
package of doi moi reforms.2
The Success of Doi Moi
The success of doi moi has been well-documented in the literature (Dollar 1994,
Lipworth and Spitaller 1993, and World Bank 1993), but less well- known are the
favourable effects on macroeconomic stabilization of the structural changes set in
train as a result of reforms during the 1980s before doi moi was launched.
Firstly, the ability to purchase goods and services on the parallel markets increased
the transactions demand for money as incomes grew. This is reinforced by the fact
that the ratio of money holdings to income was very low in Vietnam prior to 1989
(less than 10% for the M1/GDP ratio).  The increase in transactions demand for
money is evidenced by a very high and significant income elasticity of money
demand estimated for the period 1978 to 1991 (Leung and Vo 1996). This means that,
                                                
2 In addition to stringent budgetary and monetary policies, this package included the abolition of price
controls, the unification of exchange rates resulting in a fivefold devaluation of the dong, the granting
of full autonomy to SOEs in terms of their pricing, production and investment decisions while at the
8for any given increase in domestic credit, the impact on inflation is likely to be less
because of a more rapid growth in the demand for money.
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the positive real interest rates paid on dong
deposits at Vietnamese banks as from 1989, as well as the confidence engendered by
the doi moi package generally, had resulted in a movement away from holdings of
dollar and gold into dong assets (a reversal of currency substitution, see Leung and
Vo 1996). Indeed, there was a tripling of household savings between 1988 and 1989
(from 1.5% to 5.3% of GDP), and part of this would have been done at the expense of
holding dollar and gold. Given the tight monetary policy at the time, the increased
bank deposits would have been sterilized; that is, not spent or given as credit through
the State Bank. Therefore, the structural shift towards increased demand for dong
would have had a dampening effect on inflation.
Finally, the increase in bank credit in 1993 was directed mainly to rural households
(World Bank 1994b). Given that an estimated 72% of the rural sector had previously
taken loans from the informal sector, the credit expansion of 1993 could well have
been offset by a fall in credit provided by the informal sector. Therefore, the net
inflationary impact would have been reduced significantly as a result3. In short, the
development of parallel markets and the availability of choices to households
(including asset portfolio choices) made the task of macroeconomic stabilization
easier for the government once the changes in the macroeconomic relationship
                                                                                                                                           
same time, severing the budget support for SOEs, the return to the family farm on the basis of long
term leases, and the start of reforms in foreign trade and foreign direct investment.
3 Using the black market prices for the years during which price controls were enforced, Vo (1997)
found that the correlation coefficient between the change in domestic credit and the general retail price
level fell from 0.884 for the period 1978-88 to 0.047 for the period 1989-95.
9between the budget and the SOEs on the one hand, and between the budget and the
central bank on the other, were accomplished.
Another success attributed to doi moi is the rapid growth of agricultural output. Rice
production, in particular, grew at an annual rate of 6.1% between 1988 and 1994,
turning Vietnam from a rice importer to the world’s second largest exporter. Unlike
the years under central planning (1976-80) and then under the contract system (1981-
87), this period was characterized by very high rates of capital investment in farming
(see Table 1 above). The granting of long term leases and the growing profits
resulting from liberalization of internal and international trade in rice were seen as the
main reasons for the high rate of capital accumulation (Che, Kompas and Vousden
1999). These were direct incentive effects resulting from the doi moi package of
reforms.
 In addition to these direct effects, there would have been the issue of the financing of
physical capital accumulation in agriculture. Because of poorly functioning capital
markets in Vietnam in the early 1990s, and the “lumpy” (or indivisible) nature of
capital investments (McKinnon 1973), rural households would probably have had to
save for a period of time before investments could be made. In spite of the period of
hyperinflation in 1985-88, the emerging profits in the rural sector throughout the early
part of the 1980s and more particularly since 1989 would have enabled such savings
to take place. The expansion of bank credit to rural areas in 1993 (discussed above)
would have also helped in the financing of capital expenditures. Therefore, both the
supply of finance and the confidence to invest (through the granting of the long term
leases) were present, and contributed to the success of doi moi.
10
Role of the State
These developments in Vietnam in the 1980s clearly show the key role played by the
state in moving away from central planning. By reacting piecemeal to a series of
crises and shortages, the state had, wittingly or unwittingly, allowed parallel markets
to flourish. Once market forces had been unleashed and people’s choices and
economic horizons expanded, it was easier for the state to stabilize the macroeconomy
in 1989, and to move further towards a market economy.
In other words, during the 1980s, there was a confluence between economic and
political forces. Food shortages which represented a threat to political stability gave
the impetus to move away from central planning. The resultant growth in parallel
markets underlined the flaw in the confiscatory monetary policy of 1985 which
necessitated a “bail out” of SOEs, resulting in greater economic and political
instability from hyperinflation. This, together with the imminent collapse of the
former Soviet Union, galvanized the government into fundamentally changing the
macroeconomic relationships in pursuit of macroeconomic and political stability. The
latter task was made easier because of the structural economic reforms carried out
earlier in the decade. The interplay between economics and politics was mirrored by
the interplay between microeconomic/structural reforms and macroeconomic
stabilization, each reinforcing the other.
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It will be argued in the next section that the fortuitous confluence between economics
and politics was not sustained into the 1990s. In particular, the desire to protect the
SOEs resulted in distortions that bias against a sustainable growth strategy based on
export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing. Furthermore, the 1997-98 financial
and banking crisis of the East Asia has, in some quarters, encouraged the misguided
view that administrative controls can be an effective answer to macroeconomic and
political instability.
II. Growth under state control in the 1990s
The spectacular turnaround of the Vietnamese economy in the first half of the 1990s
is now well known (see Graph 1). Between 1991 and 1997, real GDP grew at between
7% and 9% p.a.; inflation remained mostly in the single digits; exports grew at an
average rate of around 30% p.a., and foreign direct investments flooded in at a rapid
rate. However, even in the midst of this impressive performance, and prior to the
outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis, certain structural problems associated
principally with state controls began to emerge.
12
Weaknesses in the Pattern of Growth
Firstly, an overwhelming majority (about 98%) of the foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows went into the state sector, chiefly in the form of joint ventures with the SOEs.
This trend was so prominent that the state sector was actually expanding relative to
the non-state sector during this period of rapid economic growth in Vietnam (Graph
2). However, the frustrations of foreign investors were already apparent by 1995 (see
Kokko and Zejan 1996). By the end of 1996, FDI approvals, excluding the last minute
approvals of two large real estate projects, had begun falling (Leung 1997).
13
Graph 2: GDP by Ownership
Secondly, in spite of the high rates of growth in exports, Vietnam’s export record
between 1988 and 1997 in textiles and garments (the barometer for labour-intensive
manufacturing exports in developing countries) was “...impressive but not outstanding
in international perspective” (Hill 2000, p. 288). Even accepting that Vietnam was a
latecomer in this activity, its per capita export of textiles and garments in 1996 was
only about half that of China’s ($US 16.7 compared with $US 31 in China; see Hill
2000). The lack of access to the US market on MFN terms was a serious barrier.
Being a latecomer also meant that, like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and in contrast to
China, Indonesia and Thailand, Vietnam had been a large net importer of textiles,
reflecting the underdeveloped nature of the upstream textiles industry, largely state-
owned. However, unlike all the other five countries, Vietnam’s net trade ratio
(defined as exports minus imports divided by total trade) for textiles and garments
taken together was very close to zero, compared with net trade ratios in the range of
0.34 to 0.67 for the other countries (Hill 2000). Also, unlike the other countries, the
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proportion of state ownership was relatively high in textiles and garments, and this is
reflected generally throughout the manufacturing sector in Vietnam. All these factors
point to structural problems on the supply side of the industry.
Thirdly, by 1997, Vietnam’s domestic financial sector was still largely under-
developed. 75% of total assets of the financial sector was controlled by four large
state-owned commercial banks. Even though this is fairly common amongst
developing countries, and reflects the fact that banks generally are more efficient in
handling the problems of information asymmetry and adverse selection so prevalent
in information-intensive industries such as finance (Mishkin 1996, also see Section III
below), the relatively low deposit/GDP ratio and the high currency/deposit ratio
suggest that there was (and still is) significant distrust amongst the public regarding
financial institutions 4. Furthermore, over half of the assets of the state-owned banks
were in the form of loans to SOEs (admittedly down from 90% in 1990 to 55% by
1997, see Leung and Doanh 1998). This, together with the Law on Credit Institutions
enacted in 1997 providing for preferential bank credit for SOEs, cooperatives, and
remote areas, means that the commercial viability of Vietnamese banks and other
financial institutions was being seriously undermined, and the financial sector made
vulnerable to the fortunes of the SOEs.
The SOE problem
State-owned enterprises in Vietnam dominate the industrial sector.  In the economy as
a whole, SOEs and their foreign joint-venture partners account for about 50 percent of
15
GDP, and in the manufacturing sector their share of value-added is about 75 percent.
Their claim on the nation’s savings is even greater than their relative contribution to
GDP, with about 80 percent of all investment outlays accounted for by the SOEs and
their joint-venture partners.   As providers of employment, however, their contribution
is small, absorbing only 10 percent of the labor force.  Thus, the private sector, which
consists mostly of household farms and businesses, absorbs 90 percent of the labour
force, but is allocated only 20 percent of the nation’s capital resources.
The dominance of SOEs in the industrial sector is a serious matter because
SOEs in Vietnam, like their counterparts in most other countries, are notoriously
inefficient.  The manifestation of their inefficiency is a lack of profitability.  A 1997
survey by the Ministry of Finance found that 60 percent of SOEs, accounting for 45
percent of employment in the State sector, were unprofitable.  Since the operating
losses of SOEs have to be financed either out of the government budget or through
loans from the banking system, the SOE problem spreads throughout the entire
economy, either by creating macroeconomic instability or by crowding more worthy
borrowers out of credit markets.  When SOEs cannot service or repay their debt, the
entire financial system may be put in jeopardy.
The extent to which the SOE problem threatens the banking system is indicated in
Table 3, which reveals the extent to which SOEs dominate both domestic and foreign
currency credit.  The problem of crowding out was exacerbated during the 1998
economic downturn, when SOEs increased their borrowing from the banking system
to finance inventory accumulation and financial losses.  At the end of 1999, SOE debt
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stood at 199 trillion dong (US$14.2 billion), a significant proportion of which the
SOEs are unable to service or repay.  According to the State Bank of Vietnam, 14.5
percent of outstanding bank loans (135 trillion dong or US$9.3 billion) are non-
performing, though some experts suggest the figure could be as high as 30 percent of
outstanding loans if international accounting standards were applied (World Bank,
20/3/2000).
Table 3: State Enterprises Borrowing from the Banking System: 1995-98
1995 1996 1997 1998
Credit to SOEs/Credit to the Economy 56 52 49 52
SOCB Credit to SOEs/Total SOCB Credit 62 57 55 57
SOCB Foreign Currency SOE Loans/Total 91 93 90 91
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/55, statistical appendix.
The SOE problem—their dominance of the industrial sector and their general
inefficiency—lies at the heart of development challenge facing Vietnam.  More
investment must go to enterprises that earn higher returns and as a result generate
more growth per dollar saved and invested.  More investment must go to those sectors
that have the capacity to create productive employment for the millions unemployed
and underemployed workers.  More investment must go to those sectors that have the
capability of competing in world markets and earning the foreign exchange needed to
keep the growth engine running.  Finally, more investment must go to those
enterprises that are potentially profitable and capable of paying the taxes that are
necessary to finance government spending on social and economic infrastructure.
                                                                                                                                           
currency/deposit ratio, on the other hand, was 54% in Vietnam, compared with 16% in China, and
lower figures in other ASEAN countries, (see World Bank 1997c).
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Discrimination against the Private Sector
Many of the structural problems facing Vietnam are related to the allocation of land
use rights in favour of SOEs at the expense of the domestic private sector. FDI flows
and flows of bank credit went to the state sector partly because the SOEs were (and
still are) the only institutions provided with clear land use rights over urban land
which could be used as collateral in joint venture projects and in securing bank loans.
Private sector firms seeking credit have had to go to the informal sector where interest
rates are typically several percentage points higher than in the formal sector.
Added to this is the administration of the trade regime and the allocation of export
quotas in particular, in favour of the SOEs ( for details on trade regime and policy, see
CIE 1998). For example, in the textiles and garments industry, upto 80% of the export
quotas were allocated to SOEs who usually were not able to fulfill the allocations and
therefore sold the unused portions on the market to the private sector at a fee
equivalent to about 5% of the value of the quotas (Hill 2000).
All this adds significantly to the uncertainty and cost of doing business in Vietnam,
with the result that, in spite of private companies in Vietnam having quadrupled in
numbers since 1992, about 80% of the new companies are in the form of household
enterprises, and most of these are enagaged in trade and commerce rather than in
manufacturing (Riedel 2000). The “missing ingredient” is the small to medium sized
firms engaging in labour intensive manufacturing and exporting (Riedel 1999)
.
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Vietnam’s lack of an adequate legal/commercial infrastructure providing the
confidence to invest in manufacturing is seen to be a key factor behind its failure to
take advantage of its considerable potential in labour intensive exports. Underlying
this lack of infrastructure is an unwillingness on the part of the bureaucracy to remove
controls over, or to “unshackle”, exporters and others in the domestic private sector.
The imposition of the many trade licenses, and the intense bureaucratic opposition to
the initial removal of 84 different licenses, is another example of the deep-seated
distrust on the part of the state for legitimate private sector activities (CIEM briefing
March 2000). The excessive reliance on bureaucratic discretion, together with low
salaries in the public sector, forms the basis for corruption, with negative impact on
the institutional credibility of the country from the viewpoint of investors, and hence
on growth (WDR 1997). According to surveys of business perception of corruption
undertaken by Transparency International, Vietnam ranks 79 out of a total of 99
countries surveyed. It is placed lower (that is, considered more corrupt) than Malaysia
(33), Philippines (54), China (59), Thailand (69), and India (73), but is considered less
corrupt than Pakistan (88) and Indonesia (97).
In the short term, there appears to be a conflict between Vietnam’s economic
objectives for rapid growth and employment creation on the one hand, and its political
desire to control private sector activities on the other.
“Wrong” Lessons Learnt from Financial Crises
The belief in administrative controls was unfortunately boosted by Vietnam’s being
shielded substantially from the immediate turmoil of the Asian financial crisis through
19
extensive controls over international trade, investment and finance. Even before the
Asian crisis erupted in July 1997, Vietnam had its version of a “mini” financial crisis
(for a detailed analysis, see Leung and Doanh 1998). The combination of a tight
monetary policy and a pegged exchange rate regime in 1996 had opened up
differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates, and set up incentives for
enterprises to borrow unhedged in foreign currencies. The opportunity to do so amidst
extensive capital controls came in the form of trade credits guaranteed by Vietnamese
state-owned banks for foreign purchases by Vietnamese SOEs. This amounted to
SOEs borrowing foreign currencies short term guaranteed by state-owned banks, and
the amount of such borrowings grew rapidly. In the event, some SOEs used their
funds to fuel a real estate bubble while some others used the imported inputs in
products where the markets had declined. By early 1997, an estimated 40% of the
guaranteed letters of credit (equivalent to 3% of GDP) became bad debts. Following
the State Bank rescue which significantly reduced Vietnam’s international reserves
and credit rating, substantial controls were imposed on guaranteed letters of credit.
Unfortunately, instead of recognizing the vulnerability of the banking sector and the
dangers of the pegged exchange rate supported by extensive capital controls, the
lesson learnt from this episode was Vietnam’s need to rely on the successful
implementation of controls to fend off the emerging financial crisis. Furthermore, by
dealing with the foreign exchange shortage (crisis) through rationing, many of the
most worthy claimants of foreign exchange (private small medium enterprises) were
crowded out of the market.  Foreign exchange rationing may have been an important
reason for the fall off in exports since without imported materials and capital, many
firms could not expand exports.
20
Reduction of Poverty through Growth
Low inflation rapid growth in the 1990s has brought significant reduction in poverty
in Vietnam. In a study comparing the two Vietnam Living Standards Surveys taken in
1992-93 and then in 1997-98, it was found that poverty, as defined by the percentage
of population with less than 2100 calories of food consumption per day, fell from
53% in 1992-93 to about 26% in 1997-98 (see Liu 2000). Improvements have been
most marked in the urban areas where poverty has fallen from about 32% of the
population to a little over 10% in the course of five years. In the rural areas, however,
about 30% of the population are still living below the poverty line, albeit a fall from
58 % in 1992-93. This development has meant that Vietnam now compares favorably
with developing countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but lags behind
quite substantially in terms of the poverty index compared with China (Liu 2000,
Table 7).
China’s apparent success in reducing rural poverty lies significantly in the fact that
people in the countryside have been able to get non-farm employment through the
process of rural industrialization, in part via the setting up of township village
enterprises (TVEs) (Luong and Unger 1998). However, it has been argued that the
TVEs were a sub-optimal (albeit temporarily successful) response to the opportunities
and constraints that existed in China at the time, and that the same opportunities and
constraints are not currently present in Vietnam (Huang 1999). For instance, China’s
TVEs took advantage of the gap left by its heavy industry-oriented state-owned
enterprises in the supply of consumption goods to the domestic market. In Vietnam,
this gap in consumption goods is already filled by urban enterprises as well as by
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imports. Furthermore, there does not appear to be quite the same degree of political
constraints on private ownership in rural Vietnam today as there was in China in the
early 1980s. Export-oriented industrialization a la Taiwan rather than rural
industrialization a la China remains the ‘first best” strategy for Vietnam.
III.  The State as Catalyst for Growth in the 21st Century
“Second generation reforms may be seen as the set of measures to enable a country to
attain, in a sustained way, high-quality growth. Such growth will enable the economy
to function more efficiently in – and to derive greater welfare from – the globalized
economy…”(Camdessus 1999).
A necessary condition for the implementation of second generation reforms is the
development of effective institutions (both formal and informal). This is especially
relevant for Vietnam in its efforts to maximize the benefits of international integration
in finance and trade, and at the same time, to minimize the potential instability
associated particularly with international capital flows. A sound and robust domestic
financial sector is an undeniable pre-requisite for joining the international financial
markets, and the state has a very clear responsibility in setting the appropriate
institutional framework in this regard.
Institutional Framework for a Well-functioning Domestic Financial Sector
The very nature of finance involves transfers of funds (from lenders to borrowers) at
one point in time, with expectations of repayments (with interest and/or dividend) at
subsequent points in time. Laws enforcing contracts and property rights are clearly
fundamental to the effective functioning of a financial sector.
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Furthermore, because borrowers can be expected to have better information about
their own situations and prospects than lenders (the asymmetric information problem),
lenders have to gather sufficient information about borrowers to ensure that borrowers
with unacceptably high default risks would be excluded. That is, to guard against
“adverse selection”. Also, once the loans are made, further monitoring is needed to
guard against reckless behaviour on the part of borrowers which could lead to default
on repayment (the “moral hazard” problem). Finance is, therefore, a highly
information-intensive industry. This information is valuable not only to ensure
repayment of loans, but more importantly, to maximize the efficiency of investments,
promoting economic growth. A well-functioning financial sector is, therefore,
essential to economic development, quite apart from being a pre-requisite for
maintaining macroeconomic stability once the economy opens to international
financial markets.
The information-intensive nature of finance helps explain the relatively
underdeveloped state of this sector in transitional economies such as Vietnam. If
information on borrowers was not readily available and/or unreliable (in other words,
“opaque”), then financial transactions could be expected to take place in the informal
sector amongst families and friends where personal knowledge could be expected to
fill the gap. At the other extreme, if information on borrowers was readily available in
a standardized format, then stock markets and other securities markets could be
expected to develop (White 1999). In the intermediate range where information is
semi-opaque, financial intermediaries such as banks would be expected to play a
strong role since these are institutions that have the comparative advantage in the
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gathering of financial information on borrowers (Mishkin 1996). This is consistent
with the observation that banks usually dominate financial sectors in developing
countries. In the case of Vietnam, the dominance of the state owned commercial
banks (75% of total financial sector assets) is attributable more to their connections
with SOEs than to availability of information or public confidence in the banking
sector. Indeed, the very low degree of financial deepening as well as the prevalence of
dollar holdings in Vietnam indicates that the degree of information opaqueness is well
below the intermediate range. Therefore, one important role for the state in
developing financial markets is to promote regulations relating to information. This
would include laws relating to the regular issuance, on the part of publicly traded
companies, of financial information on a standardized basis using internationally
accepted accounting and auditing practices. The institution of government bodies such
as the securities and exchange commission and of professional bodies such as the
institute of chartered accountants and auditors would greatly facilitate this process.
The accreditation of five local firms as auditors in Vietnam is a step in this direction,
although their credibility would be enhanced if some of the accredited auditors
include foreign firms with international reputation and experience. In the absence of
underlying institutions (both the formal laws and the government and professional
bodies) giving credibility and transparency to the financial performance of
Vietnamese firms, the stock market will fail to function properly.
The information asymmetry problem in finance also means that depositors’ interests
vis-à-vis banks need to be safeguarded as the confidential nature of commercial
banks’ dealings with their customers means that it is very difficult, if not impossible,
for depositors to monitor the activities of their banks (Mishkin 1996). This provides
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the basis for the plethora of prudential regulations of financial intermediaries,
including minimum capital requirements, restrictions on certain activities, honesty
and competence on the part of the owners and senior management of banks, market
value accounting, and so on. These regulations normally entail a government
prudential supervisory body (be it the central bank or a separate body) that is
responsible for carrying out the supervision of financial intermediaries. Prudential
regulations also encompass the corporate governance of financial intermediaries. In
the case of Vietnam, the establishment in 1999 of the National Development Support
Fund to provide directed lending to state-targeted projects is a step in the right
direction. However, the setting up of State Bank loans to re-capitalize the commercial
banks, and the establishment of an Asset Management Corporation to manage the
non-performing loans and to remove them from the balance sheet of those banks are
still under consideration.
Nevertheless, greater flexibility in the management of loan interest rates has been
introduced. This should constitute a positive step towards promoting competition in
the financial sector. With greater depth in the government bond market, the State
Bank will, in due course, be able to move from conducting monetary policy through
credit ceilings on banks to the use of open market operations, thereby further utilizing
market forces rather than direct controls.
Because of the importance of finance to the growth of small to medium sized
enterprises engaged in labour-intensive manufacturing (Riedel 1999), the success of
the Vietnamese government in developing market-friendly and efficiency-enhancing
regulations, while at the same time removing direct controls over interest rates and
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credit allocation, can be truly catalytic. On the other hand, the state owned
commercial banks with their stocks of non-performing loans could be a “fiscal time
bomb” (Flatters 2000), and failure on the part of the government to re-structure the
banking sector could result in a serious threat to macroeconomic and political
stability. Whilst enacting laws and building other less formal institutions take time
and human capital, the “post crisis” on-going efforts by many East Asian countries in
the area of financial sector reform provide plenty of learning opportunities. In this
regard, Vietnam’s membership of ASEAN is invaluable, in addition to the benefits of
opening the country to international trading opportunities. The joining of ASEAN is,
of course, another example of the catalytic role of the state.
Controls over International Capital Flows
The importance of market-friendly, efficiency-enhancing regulations applies equally
to the external financial sector. The potential instability of short term capital flows is
well-demonstrated by the East Asian financial crisis. However, attempts to control
these short term flows should focus on taxing inflows (such as forced lodgment of a
certain proportion of short term inflows with the central bank at zero rates of interest)
rather than directly controlling outflows. Not only are such controls more effective in
discouraging short term flows, they also allow the recipient country to benefit from
whatever short term flows that do occur.
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Currently, Vietnam’s foreign exchange regulations appear to be more focused on
controlling imports and promoting certain industries than on managing the instability
of short term capital flows (Flatters 2000). The present regulations also help support a
pegged exchange rate which, from time to time, is in danger of being over-valued,
with negative consequences for manufacturing exports, feeding back to balance of
payments difficulties, and more import controls via exchange regulations, in a
downward spiral. Furthermore, the complexity and opaqueness of Vietnam’s foreign
exchange regulations discourage long term capital flows and distort the efficient use
of the capital that do enter (McCarty 1999). They also encourage domestic savings in
the form of US dollar holdings outside the banking system, and hence prevent such
savings from being channeled into domestic investment and growth (see Leung and
Duc 1999). An overhaul of Vietnam’s foreign exchange regulations would free up
significant domestic and foreign capital for effective investment. This is another area
where appropriate regulations could be developed which would enhance growth and
help manage macroeconomic instability at the same time.
Institutional Framework for Taking Advantage of International Trading Opportunities
Much has been written about ways to improve Vietnam’s current trading regime (see
CIE 1998, Warner 2000). Briefly, these include relaxation of administrative controls
over international trade and associated quantitative restrictions, rationalization of
customs duties and their interactions with domestic taxes, improvement in the
administration of customs, reduction in direct impediments to exports, and the
institution of coordinating bodies within the government to provide advice on trade,
industrial and agricultural policies. In addition to these, Vietnam’s membership of
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international bodies such as the ASEAN, APEC, and potentially of the WTO would
help consolidate reforms at the domestic level. Furthermore, the recent ratification of
the bilateral trade agreement with the US should give a boost to labour-intensive
manufacturing exports the tariff on which will drop from 40% to 4%. In return, this
agreement, amongst other things, requires Vietnam to open some of its most protected
sectors such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications to 100% US owned firms
within the next seven years. The implementation of this provision will require
Vietnam to develop its courts and judiciary system in order to handle appeals from
domestic and foreign firms against administrative decisions of the government.
Therefore, with the signing of the US bilateral trade agreement, Vietnam has
effectively committed itself to an overhaul of its judiciary system. If successful, this
will mean that laws governing commerce (for example, Enterprise Law and
Bankruptcy Law) will be given real meaning as breaches of the law will be brought to
the courts and punished under the law.
Effective Partnership with the Private Sector in the Provision of Infrastructure
Services5
According to the government estimates, a minimum annual investment of US$ 3
billion, or 12 percent of GDP, is required in the coming years to meet Vietnam’s
needs for physical infrastructure. There are four potential sources of funding: (1) the
government budget, (2) self-financing by the state-owned infrastructure enterprises,
funded mainly by credit from the state-owned banks, (3) overseas development
assistance (ODA), and (4) private (mainly foreign) investment.
                                                
5 This sub-section is mainly taken from Riedel (2000).
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Based on current estimates, the government budget can, at best, be expected to
contribute only about one-fourth of the total financial requirement for infrastructure
investment, or three percent of GDP. In the coming years, according to the World
Bank, ODA flows to Vietnam are unlikely to be more than about 2 percent of GDP
annually, even if disbursements are accelerated (Vietnam-CG meeting, 1999). This
leaves an infrastructure financial gap of about 6 to 7 percent of GDP, or about US$ 2
billion to be met through self-financing by infrastructure SOEs and from private
sources.
SOEs are likely to receive lower, rather than higher, levels of bank credit for
infrastructure investment, given that the state-owned banks are in financial difficulty
(mainly due to SOE debt) and are undergoing restructuring (see Section II above).
Contribution from the private sector in infrastructure finance is therefore essential.
For this to occur, changes to the existing policy and institutional framework are
needed.
The government of Vietnam has taken measures to encourage private participation in
infrastructure, including various decrees to permit and encourage BOT projects.
However, serious impediments remain, including price controls that make
infrastructure projects unprofitable, the lack of a proper legal framework, excessive
bureaucracy and prolonged negotiations, a weak regulatory regime, and the lack of a
transparent bidding process (Vietnam-CG meeting, 1999, p.45). Removing these
obstacles and tapping the potential of private investment in infrastructure is of utmost
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importance given the existing financing gap in infrastructure investment. In addition,
foreign participation in infrastructure can contribute significantly to raising the
efficiency of infrastructure providers by introducing competition and gaining access
to new technologies and management practices. This is closely linked to issues of
SOE reforms and competition policy.
SOE Reforms and Monopoly Regulations
The National Assembly of Vietnam has approved plans to deal with the SOE problem
by diversifying ownership through equitization and divestiture and raising the
efficiency of retained SOEs by restructuring and downsizing. So far, more than 700
SOEs have been equitized since 1999. Over the next five years, the government’s plan
is to reduce the number of SOEs further from the current number of 5,280 to 2,000
enterprises by the year 2005, which according to the NERC Vice Chairman, Pham
Viet Muon, will be “mainly working in the public welfare sector and the State
monopoly branches, maintaining a a leading role in the national economy” (Saigon
Economic Times, 25/5/2000).
The impact of equitization on the economy has so far been relatively minor, since
only the smaller SOEs, the majority capitalized at less than 10 billion dong
(US$700,000) have been selected for equitization.  The impact of equitization on the
performance of the firms themselves has not been thoroughly analyzed. The only
available evidence is an IFC study of the first 14 equitizations, which reported that
company performance improved after equitization, but attributed the result to the
strong initial position of these companies rather than to equitization per se. In the
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press, it is frequently reported that turnover and profits of equitized companies have
increased and that the shares of equitized companies trade in the unofficial market at a
25 to 30 percent premium, but this is hardly solid evidence of the success of
equitization.
Indeed, there are reasonable grounds for concern about the efficacy of equitization as
a means of raising the efficiency of SOEs. One of the most serious limitations of the
equitization program in Vietnam is the statutory restrictions that are imposed on
equity share holding, which serve to limit the ownership share of outside investors.
As Table 4 shows, the majority ownership of most equitized SOEs is held by the State
and the employees of the enterprises.  This is a matter of concern because evidence
from China and elsewhere is that little is gained in terms of improved efficiency and
profitability when the majority-owners of equitized enterprises are insiders.













Ministries 43 33 40 27
Corporations 22 19 43 38
Provinces 159 9 63 28
Source: World Bank, Preparing for Take-off? Consultative Group Meeting for Vietnam, December
1999, p.38.
Perhaps even more important than equitization, which is focused on the smaller SOEs,
is the program of restructuring and downsizing larger SOEs.  A monitoring system is
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being planned to keep tabs on bank borrowing and budgetary support for the larger,
highly-indebted SOEs, and they are to be made subject to credit ceilings to ensure that
they implement restructuring. Of course, any program of SOE reform would be
incomplete if it did not address the problems of the State’s General Corporation,
especially in the traded-goods sectors, which are going to come under increasing
pressure from both domestic and foreign competitors as Vietnam fulfills its
obligations under the AFTA and the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement.
In the non-traded goods sectors, the large corporations bring significant monopoly
power into strategic sectors of the economy such as energy, aviation,
telecommunication and transport. Without an adequate competition policy, the costs
flowing to the traded goods sector are high, thereby compounding the problems of the
SOEs in this sector as they face international competition as a result of Vietnam’s
fulfilling its obligations under the US-BTA and AFTA.
In August 1995, the drafting of anti-monopoly legislation was formally placed on the
legal reform agenda. But regulating monopolies is a complex task that involves a
balance between preventing the abuse of monopoly powers and stifling incentives to
invest and reduce costs. It would be preferable to promote competition through
industrial re-structuring, and to regulate only those segments that are rendered natural
monopolies by virtue of technology.
Industrial re-structuring and the introduction of competition policy are further “second
generation” reform measures that would strengthen an economy and prepare it for
taking full advantage of international integration. They would also facilitate private
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sector participation in the provision of infrastructure services (see sub-section above).
However, given the relatively weak capability of Vietnam’s public sector currently,
priority should be given to the re-structuring of finance and trade, and the removal of
discriminatory measures against the domestic private sector. Industrial re-structuring
and competition policy should, however, be on the agenda of debate over SOE
reforms so that the focus can be shifted away from the short term concerns about the
financial state of the loss making SOEs to the much broader and potentially more
serious impact of government owned monopolies on the entire economy.
Institutional Framework for Social Insurance
The transition to a market economy where decisions regarding production,
consumption and investment are made at an individual and firm level implies that
risks have become more idiosyncratic (individual-specific). A market economy means
that individuals are freed from the traditional ties of families, kinship, and/or work
units and communes, to pursue his/her talents to the best of his/her abilities. This
underpins the dynamism and growth potential of a market economy. The downside is
that the individual is subject to greater income variability, and is less able to tap into
traditional sources of income support (Rodrik 1999). Without adequate social
insurance, this could lead to social strife and chaos, with significantly negative impact
on growth.
In most industrialized western countries after the Great Depression and the Second
World War, the welfare state emerged as an institutional solution to the problem of
social insurance (Rodrik 1999). This has been found to be costly, both in terms of the
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fiscal drain and of the impact on effort, and these countries have been in the process
of trying to wind back the welfare state arrangements.
In Japan until recent years, employment practices such as life-long employment, and
protection of domestic industries can be viewed as a form of social insurance in order
to ensure social cohesion and stability (Rodrik 1999). This too has been found to be
highly costly in terms of economic growth.
Indeed, central planning itself can be viewed as an institution of social insurance, and
history has shown that this is perhaps the costliest system of all.
Therefore, the search for an adequate and least cost solution to social insurance is
occurring worldwide. At Vietnam’s current stage of economic development, and as a
society with very strong family ties, the state could perhaps combine elements of
traditional family and kinship support with selected welfare programs of the
industrialized western economies. A detailed discussion of the options for Vietnam is
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that the continuous development of an
institutional framework for least cost social insurance within the context of a market
economy remains one of the biggest challenges for governments in the 21st century.
Conclusions
This paper documents the changing role of the state as Vietnam moved away from
central planning in the 1980s towards developments of markets and greater
integration with the world economy. It argues that initial structural/microeconomic
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reforms in agriculture and industry in the early 1980s reinforced macroeconomic
stabilization at the end of the decade such that political and economic forces
converged to bring about the success of Doi Moi. However, the concern about
instability associated with private sector activity and the desire to control it
throughout the latter part of the 1990s have meant that Vietnam has not been able to
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by international integration in trade
and finance. On the other hand, low inflation and rapid growth have brought
significant benefits, including substantial reduction in poverty. Continuation of
growth through export of labour intensive manufactures is both an economic and
political imperative.
To do this, the role of the state has to be re-defined away from that of “controller” of
the private sector to that of a “partner” working with the private sector to promote
growth. Laying the legal/commercial foundation for finance and trade, whilst
removing the discrimination against the domestic private sector, is the first priority in
this regard. The successful implementation of the Enterprise Law is an indication that
this process could be already underway.  Attention then needs to be re-focused away
from equitization of loss making SOEs towards a more comprehensive plan for
industrial re-structuring and the introduction of competition policy so that Vietnam’s
domestic economy can be made more internationally competitive. At the same time, a
framework for social insurance appropriate to Vietnam’s situation needs to be
instituted.
Once it is understood and accepted that the state has a catalytic role in promoting
growth together with the private sector, then there is the further task of improving the
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capacity of the state so that it can continue to pursue market-friendly and efficiency-
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